60 MINUTES
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BRADLEY: Since the end of the second World War, about a thousand defectors from the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries have come over to our side with valuable information, but then became non-persons. Now some former Central Intelligence Agency officials are saying we'd better start changing our attitude toward them or lose one of our most important sources of intelligence. One of those sources was this man, Vladimir Sakharov, no relation to dissident Soviet physicist Andrei Sakharov. Vladimir Sakharov says he may have come in from the cold, but instead of a warm welcome, what he got from the CIA was a cold shoulder. If you had to describe your treatment overall by the CIA, what would you say? VLADIMIR SAKHAROV: Inefficient, unprofessional, rotten, humiliating, degrading.

BRADLEY: The sometimes shabby treatment of defectors in the CIA's resettlement program bothers Mark Wyatt. Wyatt is a former senior liaison officer between U.S. intelligence and foreign intelligence services. And why is Wyatt upset? MARK WYATT: I would say Ed that this is one of our primary sources of high level, intentional level, intelligence. Cracking the Kremlin, for a free country like the United States, is not easy. I cannot tell you whether we have an agent inside the Kremlin or not. I hope so. But it would be a pretty rare case. Because that is about the toughest nut to crack. Whereas, in the United States, the Soviets can operate pretty much with impunity. And as a result, the defector channel is terribly important to us. I don't believe that you could put a price tag on the value of intelligence that we've received from defectors, into the billions of dollars. It is, in short, invaluable to us. A good example of how valuable a defector can be is the case of the 47 Soviet diplomats who were expelled from France last spring. Intelligence experts say those expulsions from Paris, as well as similar ones from London and Rome, were made possible by the defection of Vladimir *Kusitchgen, a veteran Soviet agent who knew the system well enough to point the finger at Soviet spies in many parts of the world. Kusitchgen is one of many Soviet defectors who abandoned their families, their professions, and their countries to come in from the cold. The people fingered by Kusitchgen held diplomatic posts which they used as a cover to spy on France's most important military and industrial technology. There's no official price tag on the information they were able to gather, but the damage was heavy. The material they stole included information on advance French aircraft carriers and the neutron bomb. Like those people expelled from Paris, Sakharov was also a Soviet diplomat. He says he wanted to earn the right to come to the United States. And about 10 years ago, the CIA gave him the chance. Before defecting, he became a double agent in the Middle East. He brought to the job his knowledge of Arabic and his experience as a KGB operative in Nasser's Egypt while it was under Soviet influence. Experts like Mark Wyatt say he passed on to our side first-hand information about Soviet plans to foment trouble in the Middle East and to disrupt the flow of oil to the West. When the things got too hot, as they say, he came over the mountain, ending his role as a double agent. He was debriefed in this safe house in Virginia. Sakharov expected work that would utilize his training and experience. That is not what he got. What did they do to help you settle in the United States? SAKHAROV: Well, initially, I was, they bought me one-way ticket to Hollywood. And they gave me new identity.

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BRADLEY: The new identity said he was a German immigrant. Sakharov speaks no German. He was told he would make a good shoe salesman, but later was sent to study hotel management. He recently showed us where the school was located, here in what was at the time, Hollywood's red light district. He told us that within weeks of his arrival, the school closed down. All he had was a stipend of $430 a month, which he had earned as a double agent. SAKHAROV: I do believe the agency by sending me to Hollywood tried to put me in a situation which was not survivable, in human terms. You don't take a Soviet diplomat, put him in Hollywood in a society of hookers and pimps and put him as a German in a motel management school to make a bus boy out of him. This goes beyond stupidity and inefficiency.

BRADLEY: What do you think they were trying to do? SAKHAROV: Who knows? Maybe they decided to get rid of this guy, put him in a situation which he will not survive. For example, hypothetically, if you take an American who comes to the Soviet Union, and rather than placing him in Moscow, you tell him, now you're gonna go in Irkutsk in Siberia. And you're gonna get enrolled in a school, in a school of forestry, how to chop wood. Now, American will probably, have hard time and he will feel quite desperate and he'll probably feel that his life is over by then. That's how I felt when I got to Hollywood.

BRADLEY: Donald Jamieson specialized in Soviet affairs during two decades of service for the CIA. During that time he debriefed many defectors from the Soviet Union. What happened after resettlement was not his responsibility. But he has always made it his concern. JAMIESON: There are some really awfully good people as, I'm sure many defectors would say, who really have gone out and battled for their guys in the bureaucracy. And tried to get things settled for them. But then there are those who take a rather indifferent attitude. Mostly the group involved there, are people are sort of looking for something to do, they're not those who aspire to great leadership anymore because the handling of the defector once the excitement is over, is a sort of humdrum job, or at least it's a ...

BRADLEY: It's a dead end job, basically. JAMIESON: Well, it might be.

DR. MICHAEL BULLOCK: I was a number, I was a case, only. Nobody was ever interested if I was an individual.

BRADLEY: Dr. Michael Bullock, a former official in the Hungarian government, does not fall into the category of important defector. He gave us no top secret intelligence information. Yet, like Sakharov, he said he was promised work where his experience could be used. Those promises never materialized, even though he still cooperates with the FBI. There's been no stipend. He's worked a series of odd jobs, and is now trying to put himself through law school. BULLOCK: Your cooperation with the FBI or for the same token with the CIA, is a very one-sided cooperation. If I'm cooperating with you, I think it is elementary that they would try to help me the same way as like say I help them.

BRADLEY: What angered both Bullock and Sakharov was that even after years of association, their handlers never trusted them. Wyatt says this lack of trust is a problem for most defectors. WYATT: There is this sort of prevalent notion that defectors were traitors to their own nation, and therefore they are never to be trusted. I find that dead wrong, and for this reason. You know, it's a very untidy and difficult world we live in. In the nasty business of war, the

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soldier kills. In the nasty business of espionage, the spy betrays trust. And the only justification is the worth, the moral worth, of the cause that they represent.

BRADLEY: Other countries treat defectors differently. This is *Leonid Vladimirov, a prominent Soviet journalist and science writer, who defected to Great Britain. We went with him while he was covering a chess match of another Soviet defector, *Victor Kortznoi. VLADIMIROV: What I could not imagine, in my wildest dream, the treatment, the humanity of treatment, if you like, at every junction. I was told gently, rather, advised again, never told, never ordered...I was advised that you see, we do things this way. We cross the road this way. We apply for jobs this way.

BRADLEY: In other words, you were made to feel at home? VLADIMIROV: Absolutely. That was the first thing to do.

BRADLEY: The result of such treatment? Vladimirov now works as a journalist for the BBC. He has written several books on the Soviet Union, and is considered a valuable, continuing resource by those who gave him the first leg up. Why is it important to help defectors? Why not just question them when they come out, and then let them lead their own lives. VLADIMIROV: People who come from the Soviet Union, they are totally baffled and embarrassed by what they see here. They are afraid of everything, just afraid, humanly afraid. They are not ordinary people. They need some care, and yes, there is the risk to admit some spies, if you like, even, to overlook some agents, yet Britain, perhaps, prefers to pay this price. They realize that if a defector is left alone in the street he can be picked up by the other side, by the Russians, who would do it with gusto, and he would be taken out of the country this way or that way, and not only suffer enormously, but will also make a propaganda, too.

BRADLEY: And what about the KGB? From all reports they don't follow our example. They appear to treat defectors well, if only for propaganda purposes, and to undermine Western intelligence. BULLOCK: I remember cases where Chilian communists came over. I remember cases where American Vietnam soldier defectors came over, and all these people are having government assistance, financially, morally, professionally.

BRADLEY: In other words, they make every effort to make the defector feel at home? BULLOCK: Exactly.

BRADLEY: Were you made to feel at home in this country? BULLOCK: No. I would like to have that feeling. I would like to feel myself home in the United States.

BRADLEY: Even though they don't feel at home here, Bullock and Sakharov prefer the freedom this country has to offer. If you had to do it all over again, would you do it again? SAKHAROV: I would have done the same. I would probably have done things a little bit differently here. Knowing what I know now, I would have been less fearful, as I was over the years. I was fearful of the agency.

BRADLEY: But you still would have defected? SAKHAROV: Absolutely. Absolutely. You don't understand. This country, for Americans, you take it for granted. I'm an American now, but there is a lot of things that you enjoy here.

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You can say no to your boss. You might lose your job. You can get another job, at least I can now, because I'm who I am, and you don't end up in Siberia.

BRADLEY: And better yet, Sakharov says, in this country you can say no to the CIA, and that's what he did. He resumed his own identity and went public against the wishes of the agency. He is now a visiting scholar with the Hoover Institute. He's written articles and books on the Soviet Union. In one of them he predicted the rise of Yuri Andropov almost a year before Andropov succeeded Leonid Brezhnev. He based his prediction on knowledge of the Andropov family. He had been a classmate and friend of Andropov's son, Igor, in Moscow. He has lectured, and he has briefed our defense attaches going to the Soviet Union. All of this has annoyed his handlers at the CIA. What should this country do for defectors? SAKHAROV: It isn't really that much. You start with not humiliating them, and start by not stripping their human dignity of them. When they come here they do need somebody to pour their soul. They do need some kind of compassion.

BRADLEY: Why don't we have a system akin to the British, where sort of a godfather looks after the defector? JAMIESON: In some cases we do, but I think that you're right in one thing, that the handling of these things is too much in the bureaucratic system, and that we would be probably a lot better to have somebody in that role who is just always going to be there, somebody who really feels from the beginning that it's his obligation to see this case through for the rest of the man's life.

BRADLEY: In the future, defectors may have an easier time when they come to this country. A private foundation has recently been formed to make it easier for them. It has, we've been told, the blessing of CIA Director William Casey.